Afghan Commentary Post

  An Iranian victory in its war with the United States will extend far beyond the Middle East. One place where it will be felt most strongly is Afghanistan, Iran's eastern neighbor. A more confident Tehran could reconsider its cautious relationship with the Taliban and press for a more inclusive Afghan government. But such a policy could also turn Afghanistan into another battleground for regional rivalry. In his recent Foreign Affairs article, “Iran’s Theory of Victory,” Vali Nasr examines how Tehran could turn its survival in the war into greater regional influence [verify title, date and Nasr’s exact argument] . A perceived victory could strengthen Iranian nationalism, even among citizens who oppose the ruling clerics, and encourage Iran’s leaders to pursue a more ambitious regional policy. If that happens, Afghanistan deserves particular attention. But “victory” needs unpacking. A ceasefire that leaves the clerical regime intact differs from a nuclear breakout, and both differ...

در عصر پهپادها، همسایگان خصمانه و خروج‌های اجباری، موقعیت جغرافیایی به‌تنهایی کافی نیست. در ماه سپتامبر گذشته، دونالد ترامپ، رئیس‌جمهور امریکا، در یک کنفرانس خبری مشترک با کی‌یر استارمر، نخست‌وزیر بریتانیا، گفت که امریکا تلاش می‌کند پایگاه هوایی بگرام در افغانستان را دوباره به دست آورد، زیرا «آن‌ها به چیزهایی از ما نیاز دارند.» او همچنین گفت که اهمیت این پایگاه به نزدیکی آن به محل تولید سلاح‌های هسته‌ای چین مربوط می‌شود؛ موضوعی که روزنامه نیویورک تایمز نیز به آن اشاره کرده است. منطق او قابل درک است. بگرام به چین، ایران و آسیای مرکزی نزدیک است و می‌تواند به‌عنوان پایگاهی برای نظارت بر گروه‌های تروریستی مورد استفاده قرار گیرد. من آرزو می‌کنم امریکا بتواند در آنجا حضور داشته باشد. اما پرسش اصلی امروز این نیست که آیا موقعیت بگرام مناسب است یا نه. پرسش این است که آیا موقعیت جغرافیایی هنوز به‌تنهایی کافی است؟ من معتقدم ارزش استراتژیک بگرام به چهار دلیل کاهش یافته است. نخست، طالبان. حکومت طالبان بگرام را در کنترل خود دارد. بنابراین امریکا تنها با رضایت طالبان یا از طریق زور می‌تواند به آنجا ...

  Last September, at a news conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, President Trump said the United States was trying to get Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan back "because they need things from us." He also said the base mattered because of its closeness to where China makes its nuclear weapons, according to The New York Times. His reasoning is understandable. Bagram sits close to China, Iran and Central Asia, and it could serve as a platform for watching terrorist groups. I wish America could have a presence there. But the right question today is not whether Bagram's location is good. It is whether location is still enough. I believe its value has declined, for four reasons. First, the Taliban. The Taliban government controls Bagram, so the United States could return only with its consent or by force. Consent would mean negotiating with a government Washington does not recognize, probably at a political price. Force would mean a new war. Mr. Trump's ow...

  The Misperception America Needs to Correct Wars rooted in political and social dysfunction cannot be solved by military force alone Americans tend to blame wars that go badly on the people running them. In a recent Washington Post column, Theodore R. Johnson asks whether President Trump will fire Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and argues that the Pentagon's deeper problems would remain even if he does. He is right to look past one secretary. But his argument points to a larger misperception: we rarely ask whether the military was ever capable of solving the problem it was given. The twenty years the United States spent in Afghanistan teach a lesson that should have been learned long ago: political dysfunction cannot be repaired by military power alone. Washington spent two decades and billions of dollars building Afghan security forces, yet those forces collapsed within weeks in 2021. The problem was never just whether soldiers had enough weapons or whether American troops ...

  Islamabad Conference Afghanistan's fragmentation invites foreign interference, and only the Taliban can close the door This week, in a hall in Islamabad, Afghan political figures opposed to the Taliban sat alongside officials from several regional countries under a title that left little room for subtlety: "Afghan Predicament and the Trajectory to Peace: Domestic Collapse and Government Without Legitimacy." To its critics, the two-day conference is one more example of Pakistani meddling in Afghan affairs. To its defenders, it is a rare forum for Afghans shut out of Kabul. Both views contain some truth, and neither addresses the more important question: why do Afghans so often find themselves seeking solutions in foreign capitals? The setting makes the question harder to ask. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, relations between Kabul and Islamabad have steadily worsened. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of allowing the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate ...

  The Old War Is Dead: Why Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakist shall Follow the Law of Nature This week, Pakistani aircraft struck targets in Khost, Paktia, and Kandahar, what Islamabad called precision strikes against militants who had launched drone attacks into Pakistan. Kabul reported civilian casualties, and the Taliban warned of consequences. Since 2021, when the Taliban returned to power, this script has become tragically familiar. The imbalance looks obvious. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state with a large army and modern jets. Afghanistan has no air force, a shattered economy, and a government most of the world refuses to recognize. The temptation in Islamabad is to believe that enough pressure will force Kabul to sever ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But that calculation rests on a twentieth-century idea of military power. The War That Was For most of the Cold War, victory went to the side with the biggest armies, the most bases, and the fastest aircraf...