odel II: Maududi’s Islamic State

 By Pervez Hoodbhoy the author of Pakistan: Origins, Identity and Future

e Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), whose life trajectory and political role as an ideologue we have already encountered earlier, was perhaps the most infuential among 20th century Islamic scholars in creating the notion of an Islamic state.18 Paradoxically, in the years before Partition, he had argued against a state with defned borders but, threatened by isolation and irrelevance, he eventually threw his lot in with those who chose to migrate to Pakistan. After that he did Why Couldn’t Pakistan Become an Islamic State? 289 not again question the need for Pakistan but contended that Muslims throughout the world were one single nation, and they would have to seize political power if they were to lead lives of piety.19 This explains why after his works were translated into Arabic, his insistence that Islam demands a single global Islamic state resonated across the Middle East. Maududi’s is a major theoretical attempt to unite state with religion in which there can be no separation between deen (faith) and dunya (worldly matters). Islam, he says, cannot be practiced only through prayer, contemplation, and fasting alone. He was, in fact, openly contemptuous of those who regarded piety as a goal in itself. This, he said, amounts to mere self-gratifcation. Instead, his goal was to fuse religion with politics; to create the scafoldings of a state that would enforce Islamic principles as he saw them. Irfan Ahmad argues that for Maududi, The state became central to Islamism not because of theology. Rather, the confguration of modern political formations – particularly the unprecedented interventionist role of the modern state in everyday life – catalysed the state to become central in Islamist thought. In a context where the colonial Indian state had begun to impact deeply on individual and collective lives, Maududi interpreted Islam to equate it with the state.20 Maududi says political power is what really matters. The only credible means of making Muslims lead Islamic lives is to have religious authority lie with the state. This would therefore have to be a cultural and ethical entity as well as political and administrative, and would enforce that which is enjoined by Islam. It would stand in opposition to western cultural values. Rahman points to the frequent use of the word taghut by Maududi: “any form of rule, whether Western democracy, communism, fascism, or kingship, is a revolt against this principle and is called taghut”.21 Maududi heaps contempt upon those who have surrendered to western supremacy: “those Muslims who pride themselves as modern. They are breathless in their praise of every new fad of the farangis (foreigners). They ape their dress, mannerisms, food and drink, salutations, and even copy their names. They hate anything to do with the faith and run after western ideas”.22 Maududi defnes carefully what the ideal state should be. In particular, how zimmis (non-Muslims) would fare. They may, he says, continue to live in an Islamic state, but they would be subject to restrictions: In their own towns and cities zimmis are allowed to do so (practice their religion) with the fullest freedom. In purely Muslim areas, however, an Islamic government has full discretion to put such restrictions on their practices as it deems necessary.23 The non-Muslim would have to pay jizya, literally meaning penalty. This is a protection tax levied on zimmis living under Islamic regimes afrming that their 290 Why Couldn’t Pakistan Become an Islamic State? legal status is not that of a full citizen. Maududi states that “acceptance of the jizya establishes the sanctity of their lives and property, and thereafter neither the Islamic state, nor the Muslim public have any right to violate their property, honor or liberty”.24 Maududi emphasizes that jizya is a symbol of humiliation and submission because zimmis should not be regarded as full-fedged citizens of the Islamic state even if they are natives to the country. In support of his exegesis, he cites Qur’anic verses: Qur’an 9.05: When the sacred months are past [in which a truce had been in force between the Muslims and their enemies], kill the idolaters wherever you fnd them, and seize them, besiege them and lie in wait for them in every place of ambush; but if they repent, pray regularly and give the alms tax, then let them go their way, for God is forgiving, merciful. He also quotes: Qur’an 9.29: Fight those who do not believe in God or the Last Day, and who do not forbid what has been forbidden by God and His Messenger [Muhammad], and those among the People of the Book who do not acknowledge the religion of truth until they pay tribute [jizya], after they have been brought low. Zimmis, says Maududi, may not build new churches, temples, or synagogues. However, they are allowed to renovate old churches or houses of worship provided they do not add any new construction. “Old churches” are those which existed prior to Islamic conquests and are included in a peace accord by Muslims. Construction of any church, temple, or synagogue in the Arab Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) is prohibited. It is the land of the Prophet and only Islam should prevail there. Yet, Muslims, if they wish, are permitted to demolish all non-Muslim houses of worship in any land they conquer. To be fair to Maududi, one must note that he calls for every state to be ruled by a religion even if that religion is the wrong one. Summoned before the 1954 Justice Munir Commission on the anti-Ahmadi riots of Punjab in 1953, Maududi was questioned about his advocacy of an Islamic state in Pakistan:25 Q.—Will you have any objection if the Muslims are treated under that form of Government as malishes or shudras under the law of Manu? A.—No. Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion? A.—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of afairs already exists in India. Why Couldn’t Pakistan Become an Islamic State? 291 It is of interest to note that Maududi supported democracy as a concept. Indeed, the Jamaat-e-Islami boasts of being the only party in Pakistani that actually votes its leaders into power. But no more than a single political party would be allowed, and only that which swears to enhance the Islamic way of life. Sharia would be the law of the land. Dissent would be permitted against the government but not against the state. This would be a democracy very diferent from that generally understood. Vali Nasr comments: In Mawdudi’s writings, therefore, democracy was merely an adjective used to defne the otherwise undefnable virtues of the Islamic state. The state was defned as democratic because it was an ideal state. Mawdudi used the term democratic to express the virtues of the Islamic state and embellish it because in Western political thought the term had positive connotations. Mawdudi later featured democracy in his discussions as a concern he had to contend with before the Islamic state was established…he had to deal with democratic rights because Muslims were concerned with them, especially once critics began to point to the authoritarian tendencies that were implicit in Mawdudi’s views on social organization.26 Maududi’s Islamic state does not permit birth control, bank interest, and mixing of men and women. No room is left for human volition and legislation since all legislative functions vest in God. Lack of choice is logical because, in this worldview, Islam is about everything: economics, science, politics, health, psychology, and sociology. The only function left for Muslims lies in their observance of God-given edicts and laws. In efect, Allah purchases the believer’s life for which he will be reimbursed once he enters paradise. Socialism and communism are greater threats than Christianity or the capitalist West, as Maududi saw it. In fact the horror of socialism – which he interpreted as equivalent to godlessness – shaped his attitudes towards economic issues. Using the logic he had used to defend the hugely wealthy Nizam of Hyderabad against the Hindu insurgent poor, he felt that God had sanctioned inequality on earth. This would be made up for in the afterlife. Private property was sanctioned in Islam and attempts at land reform in Punjab, he argued, were un-Islamic. He also reacted against the mobilization of workers against capitalism. In the 1970s, the Jamaat was therefore aligned against labor unions until it became clear that this strategy was a self-defeating one; thereafter, it did its best to seize the leadership of unions for its own members. In electoral terms, Maududi’s Jamaat has never done well in Pakistani politics. It has therefore had to ally itself with those who actually wield political power and infuence. As a member of the anti-Bhutto alliance in 1977, it was welcomed by General Zia-ul-Haq as a close ally and was given the most valuable opportunity in its history of furthering its agenda. Then, following 9/11, it gained infuence by joining an alliance of extreme right-wing parties, the Muttahid Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). After the 2013 elections, it allied itself with 292 Why Couldn’t Pakistan Become an Islamic State? Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in the KPK province. But in the 2018 elections, the Jamaat was completely routed, winning not a single seat in the National Assembly. Islamic parties even further to its right made huge gains, while the Jamaat actually regressed. Is it then a waste of time to spend time understanding Maududi’s ideology when, in fact, his political party has never had mass appeal? The answer is, no. Pakistan’s steady march towards greater religiosity owes much to the Jamaat and its infuence upon the public’s mind. It is through the power of Maududi’s systematic exposition of ideas – and their dissemination through an education system captured by the Jamaat during the Zia-ul-Haq years – that the Jamaat’s success ought to be measured. Other right-wing Islamic parties may garner more votes by appealing to particular constituencies. But they lack a coherent system of thought. In contrast, Maududi was able to plant seeds that formed the worldview of his party’s members which they now propagate everywhere. This is what makes a real diference. As Gramsci said, the real battleground is inside the mind: Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously “born” in each individual brain: they have had a centre of formation, or irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion – a group of men, or a single individual even, which has developed them and presented them in the political form of current reality