From Mosque to Throne: Why Mullahs Keep Returning to Power in Afghanistan

 From Mosque to Throne: Why Mullahs Keep Returning to Power in Afghanistan

When political order collapses, religion remains the only organized force capable of restoring law and order.

 

The term “Taliban” is loaded, evoking images of religious zealots and Pashtun dominance. It is true that most Taliban leaders are Pashtuns from the south and east, Sunni Muslims from rural areas, who were further indoctrinated in Pakistani religious schools, or madrasas. Yet this contemporary image obscures a deeper historical reality: in Afghanistan, when political order collapses, religion has often been the only organized force capable of restoring law and stability. The Taliban, the seeker,  are not merely a militant group—they embody a recurring pattern in Afghan society. Historically, religious leaders have acted as a reserve force, stepping in to fill political vacuums during times of crisis and retreating to the mosque once stability returned. The Taliban’s rise—from mosque to throne—is the latest enactment of this enduring script.

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Afghan history is marked by recurring cycles of state collapse and fragmentation. After Timur Shah’s death in 1793, the Durrani state began to disintegrate as his weak successors failed to maintain central authority. Tribal chiefs competed for power, plunging the country into local anarchy. During these turbulent times, religious leaders such as Mullah Mushk-i Alam in the early 19th century emerged as the only organized authority—mediating disputes, collecting zakat, enforcing moral codes, and negotiating among rival tribes. They became the backbone of Afghanistan’s social and political fabric. Similarly, mullahs in other parts of the country played the same role.

But the political wings of the mullahs were clipt during  King Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign 1880 to 1903, when he brutally suppressed , imprisoning or executing many who resisted his authority, including mullahs.

The Resurgence of religious clergy.

The paradigm shifted. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly ended the political hibernation of the mullahs, thrusting them into the forefront of resistance. They reemerged as leaders, issuing fatwas that called for jihad against the foreign invaders. Religion became the sole unifying force, motivating multi-ethnic Afghans to set aside tribal and regional loyalties and rally under the banner of Islam.

During the decade-long war, most public institutions and state structures were destroyed, giving the clergy an historic opportunity to abandon the mosques and take up arms. They were no longer known as mullahs but as commanders, governors, and politicians. Religion Once again, religion became a source of authority as the mullahs filled the vacuum left by fleeing tribal leaders and khans. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan propelled the clergy into the political arena. During this period, religious leaders made a powerful comeback by declaring jihad against the invaders. Most of the Mujahideen factions that fought the Soviets identified themselves as Islamic parties, such as Jamiat-e Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Hezb-e Islami headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Harakat-e Islami under Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. These Islamist groups soon overshadowed the more nationalist and secular movements

The influence of the religious establishment was amplified by financial support from the United States and wealthy Arab donors, aimed at undermining the then-“godless” communist regime of the Soviet Union, a rival of the U.S. Thousands of Islamists, including Osama bin Laden and groups like Al Qaeda, flocked to Pakistan—a safe haven for the Afghan mujahideen, whom U.S. President Ronald Reagan famously called “freedom fighters”—to join the struggle against the Soviet occupation. 

The major comeback occurred when the Mujahideen leaders and warlords began fighting among themselves, and the fragile post-Soviet order started to collapse. In Kandahar, a group rallied around Mullah Omar, the “one-eyed” cleric, who aimed to restore law and order. This movement soon became known as the Taliban, which quickly gained control of Kandahar and captured Kabul, the capital, in 1996. They remained in power until 2001, when the U.S. military removed them for refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden, accused of masterminding the September 11 terrorist attacks on American soil. 

This phenomenon was repeated with devastating clarity in 2021. The sudden disintegration of the US-backed Islamic Republic once again left a total governance vacuum. The government of Ashraf Ghani, plagued by corruption and with authority limited mainly to the capital and a few major cities, lacked both legitimacy and the will to defend itself. As the national army and government collapsed, the Taliban—once more the most cohesive and motivated non-state actor—seized the opportunity. They immediately reinstated the Islamic Emirate, illustrating that in the absence of a resilient political system, religious institutions remain the most organized and enduring source of authority.Afghan Islam Is More Traditional Than Fanatical

Islam integrates deeply with Afghanistan’s tribal structure, though the fusion remains incomplete. Afghans’ understanding of Islam is profoundly traditional—woven into the fabric of local customs and community life. This synthesis has produced a kind of religious ambivalence: Afghans are intensely devout, yet they resist the state’s imposition of Sharia law. For most, faith is a personal and cultural experience rather than a political project. Historically, Afghans have shown little enthusiasm for establishing an Islamic state to regulate daily life. At the same time, they have displayed a degree of tolerance toward Taliban rule. This paradox reflects a long-standing social norm that separates religion from politics: once a ruler or government was established, the mullahs traditionally retreated to their proper sphere—the mosques—pledging loyalty to the ruler while avoiding direct political involvement. Consequently, the Taliban, despite restricting girls’ education and women’s employment, face limited resistance in rural areas, where their authority is often perceived as a continuation of customary order rather than a rupture of it.

The Taliban’s endurance is rooted in Afghanistan’s tribal and clerical structures, yet this does not confer democratic legitimacy. The Afghan people have consistently resisted imposed rule. History provides a blueprint for resolution: the clergy’s political role has always been temporary, receding once the nation achieves reconciliation. The path forward, therefore, is not through military victory alone, but through a peace forged among Afghans themselves—the only force capable of persuading the Taliban to retreat from politics and return to their spiritual roles in the mosques. The Taliban regime is not invincible. It survives only with foreign assistance, while the economy stagnates under its draconian policies, including bans on women working alongside men or pursuing education beyond the sixth grade. Many Afghans view the regime as transient, confident that the day will come when the Taliban are sent back to their rightful place in the mosque.