Federalism Could Deepen Afghanistan’s Divisions

 

Afghanistan needs accountable government and meaningful local authority, not a political system that could turn ethnic differences into competing regional power centers.

Federalism has helped some countries manage political differences and distribute power. But no political system works everywhere. Political arrangements must fit a country’s history, geography, and social conditions. A system that brings stability to one country can deepen divisions in another.

Federalism emerged as a serious alternative in debates over Afghanistan’s political future after decades of war and failed governments. Since the end of the constitutional monarchy in 1973, Afghanistan has experienced a republic under Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, a communist government, the mujahideen-led Islamic State, the first Taliban Islamic Emirate, the Western-backed Islamic Republic, and the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. None established lasting political stability.

After so many failures, some Afghan intellectuals and members of the diaspora have proposed federalism as an alternative. I once supported this idea myself. I believed that distributing power among regional governments might help resolve Afghanistan’s political crisis. But I have since reconsidered. Federalism may work well in some countries, yet in Afghanistan it could turn existing divisions into new sources of conflict.

My first concern is ethnic geography. Afghanistan is home to Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other communities. Although some groups are concentrated in particular parts of the country, their populations are not neatly separated. Pashtuns live beyond the south and east. Tajiks and Uzbeks live outside their main areas of concentration. Communities overlap, families intermingle, and interethnic marriages have created ties across ethnic boundaries.

If federal regions were organized around ethnicity, where would their borders be drawn? What rights would people have if they lived in a region dominated by another ethnic group? Would they be treated as equal citizens, or would they become political minorities in their own homes? Federalism does not always require ethnic boundaries, but proposals based on ethnic autonomy must answer these questions.

Geography presents another challenge. Afghanistan is a country of villages, valleys, and mountainous communities. Even local boundaries can be difficult to establish where communities have competing claims to land and resources. Creating new federal regions would require agreement on which provinces and districts belong together, where regional capitals should be located, and how water, revenue, and natural resources should be shared. Such decisions could become another source of political disputes. Instead of settling existing disagreements, drawing new boundaries might give them a territorial dimension.

There is also the danger of empowering local strongmen. Supporters of federalism argue that transferring authority from Kabul to regional governments would bring decisions closer to the people. But proximity does not guarantee accountability. Where institutions are weak, local officials can use public positions to reward relatives, favor their own networks, and intimidate rivals. If regional leaders control appointments, public funds, and security institutions without effective checks, they may become local power brokers rather than representatives of their citizens. Federalism could then reproduce the abuses of centralized government at the regional level.

Other countries offer important lessons. Ethiopia adopted an ethnic federal system intended, in part, to accommodate its diverse population. Yet ethnic competition, territorial disputes, and violence have persisted. Research published in 2023 in the Journal of Peace Research examined communal relations in Ethiopia and found that ethnic federalism had not eliminated the risks of violence between locally dominant and nondominant groups. Ethiopia’s experience does not prove that federalism always causes conflict. It does show that creating ethnic regions cannot, by itself, resolve deep political divisions.

Nigeria offers another caution. Its federal system has helped accommodate regional interests, but competition over resources, political power, and identity remains a challenge. These experiences suggest that dividing authority among regional governments is not enough. The success of any political system depends on legitimate institutions, fair representation, and the rule of law.

Afghanistan’s answer should therefore be neither an all-powerful government in Kabul nor a federation of competing ethnic regions. The country needs a legitimate national government capable of protecting equal citizenship, coordinating economic development, and maintaining national institutions. At the same time, elected local governments should have meaningful authority over local services and development priorities. Constitutional safeguards must protect minorities everywhere, not only within regions associated with their ethnic groups.

Federalism’s advocates are right to question the record of centralized rule in Afghanistan. But the failure of previous governments does not automatically make federalism the right alternative. The real task is to build institutions that distribute power fairly while preventing any individual, faction, or ethnic group from monopolizing it.

Afghanistan needs political unity without enforced uniformity, and local participation without territorial division along ethnic lines. Its people have suffered enough from competing political projects. The next system should bring them together under common institutions and equal rights, rather than risk turning their differences into permanent regional rivalries.

After years of examining Afghanistan’s failed political experiments, I have come to believe that restoring a constitutional monarchy deserves serious consideration. Afghanistan experienced a period of relative stability under the constitutional monarchy established in 1964, although that system had its shortcomings and ultimately failed to prevent the 1973 coup. Its experience nevertheless offers lessons worth revisiting.