Has Bagram Lost Its Strategic Edge for America? Location is not enough in an age of drones, hostile neighbors and forced withdrawals.

 

Last September, at a news conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, President Trump said the United States was trying to get Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan back "because they need things from us." He also said the base mattered because of its closeness to where China makes its nuclear weapons, according to The New York Times. His reasoning is understandable. Bagram sits close to China, Iran and Central Asia, and it could serve as a platform for watching terrorist groups. I wish America could have a presence there. But the right question today is not whether Bagram's location is good. It is whether location is still enough.

I believe its value has declined, for four reasons.

First, the Taliban. The Taliban government controls Bagram, so the United States could return only with its consent or by force. Consent would mean negotiating with a government Washington does not recognize, probably at a political price. Force would mean a new war. Mr. Trump's own framing, that the Taliban "need things" from Washington, treats Bagram as a bargaining question, and that is exactly why its future would depend on a regime with leverage of its own.

Second, geography cuts both ways. Afghanistan is landlocked. Any large American presence would rely on supply routes through Pakistan or Central Asian states, which can close them for their own reasons. Bagram is far from naval support and surrounded by countries that are hostile or wary, which makes it harder to defend and resupply than most bases the United States already uses.

Third, large bases are more vulnerable than they used to be. The recent war with Iran showed this. Iran attacked American bases in the region with missiles and drones. According to The New York Times, bases in the Middle East were closed and the use of a British base was limited. Bombers now fly from the United States, and carrier groups in the Arabian Sea must be resupplied from Diego Garcia, 2,200 miles away, at the cost of extra weeks and large sums. The Times also reports that Iran, and possibly other adversaries, learned they can drive out a superpower, and that in the Middle East and Britain Washington's "hand was forced."

This is not an argument that bases are useless. Bases in Japan, Guam, Qatar and Poland face similar risks, and they remain valuable because they are close to allies, can be supplied by sea or air, and can be defended. Paul Scharre argues in Foreign Affairs that cheap drones and other widely available technology are narrowing the gap between great powers and smaller states. Iran used inexpensive weapons against far more expensive American systems, and Ukraine has shown something similar. Bagram would carry the same exposure with fewer advantages: it would be isolated, hard to resupply and fixed in place. A base that can be forced to close is a poor foundation for strategy, and Bagram is more likely than most to be forced out.

Fourth, rivals have responded to an American presence before. After the United States and Afghanistan signed the Bilateral Security Agreement in 2014, the insurgency grew, in part because NATO's combat mission was ending and forces were drawing down. At the same time, Iran deepened its contacts with Taliban factions, and the U.S. Treasury has documented Iranian money, training and support for some of them. Iran's motives were mixed, and it also worried about ISIS-K. The lesson is not that a base causes insurgency, but that rivals have had reason to make an American presence more costly, and could do so again. China, Russia and Iran all see a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan as a threat, and they have political, economic and proxy tools to raise its price.

The counterterrorism case. The strongest argument for Bagram is that it would allow persistent surveillance and strikes against terrorist groups. Over-the-horizon operations have limits: intelligence from distant bases is thinner, and strike decisions are made with less local information. The 2022 strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul shows the approach can work. The 2021 Kabul drone strike that killed civilians shows the risks.

But a small footprint does not solve the problem. Even a small presence depends on the Taliban's consent and on supply routes through other countries, and it gives rivals a fixed target and a reason to press harder. Long-range aircraft, aerial refueling, satellites, drones and partnerships can cover much of the same ground at lower risk and cost.

What America should do instead. Washington should invest in what makes distance workable: long-range strike, aerial refueling, resilient logistics and dispersed basing. It should build partnerships in Central Asia and the Gulf that do not depend on one exposed site, and strengthen naval and carrier options. It should also improve its intelligence on Afghanistan, which matters more than owning a runway.

Bagram's location is still valuable. But the United States has just learned how costly it is to hold fixed positions that adversaries can threaten. Its strategic value may no longer justify the political, military and financial cost of putting an American force there.