How Iran Victory Could Reshape Afghanistan

 

How an Iranian Victory Could Reshape Afghanistan

Tehran’s growing regional influence could challenge the Taliban, weaken Pakistan’s leverage and deepen Afghanistan’s internal divisions.

If Iran emerges from its war with the United States with a victory it can claim at home and abroad, the consequences will extend far beyond the Middle East. One place where they could be felt most strongly is Afghanistan, Iran’s eastern neighbor. A more confident Tehran could reconsider its cautious relationship with the Taliban and press for a more inclusive Afghan government. But such a policy could also turn Afghanistan into another battleground for regional rivalry.

In his recent Foreign Affairs article, “Iran’s Theory of Victory,” Vali Nasr examines how Tehran could turn its survival in the war into greater regional influence [verify title, date and Nasr’s exact argument]. A perceived victory could strengthen Iranian nationalism, even among citizens who oppose the ruling clerics, and encourage Iran’s leaders to pursue a more ambitious regional policy. If that happens, Afghanistan deserves particular attention.

But “victory” needs unpacking. A ceasefire that leaves the clerical regime intact differs from a nuclear breakout, and both differ from a decisive military outcome that humiliates Washington. Each changes Iran’s calculus differently. Regime survival alone might make Tehran more cautious in Afghanistan: a leadership that has just weathered an existential threat will want to consolidate what it has, and will be wary of opening a new front on its eastern border. A dramatic victory, by contrast, could embolden adventurism. The scenarios diverge, and so do their Afghan consequences.

Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Iran has pursued a pragmatic relationship with their government: diplomatic contacts, expanded trade, and no open support for armed opposition. Yet practical cooperation falls well short of trust. During the Taliban’s first period in power, their forces killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, bringing the two countries close to war. Today Tehran must also contend with the Taliban’s treatment of Afghanistan’s Shia community and the exclusion of other groups from power. Recent closures of Shia-linked religious, cultural and educational institutions in Kabul have exposed tensions beneath the surface [add source and date for the closures].

The critical question is whether Iran has shown any appetite for a broader Afghan government. So far, the evidence is thin. Tehran has hedged, cultivating Taliban ties while preserving contacts with opponents, but it has not funded a political alternative, pushed for an inclusive cabinet, or publicly criticized Taliban governance the way it criticizes Western sanctions. Its priorities are stability on its eastern border and leverage against the United States, rather than Afghan political reform. A victory might change that. It might also entrench the status quo, since a confident Iran has less need to gamble.

Iran does hold an economic card. Afghanistan is landlocked and has long depended on Pakistani ports and crossings. When tensions rise, Pakistan has closed them, leaving Afghan traders unable to export fresh produce or receive imports [cite a specific closure and date]. Iran offers an alternative through Chabahar port and its road and rail links, and greater use of that route could reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan while increasing Tehran’s influence. But Chabahar has real limits. Its capacity and costs are constrained, it is exposed to regional conflict, and its operations are entangled with US sanctions on Iran and with India’s role as the port’s main foreign investor [check the current status of the US sanctions waiver for Chabahar]. The Iran war itself showed how vulnerable Afghanistan remains when access to seaports is interrupted [specify what happened and cite it].

Tehran also maintains relationships with Afghan political figures and has a history of recruiting Afghan Shia fighters for regional operations. These connections could provide leverage. Yet using armed groups to shape Afghanistan’s domestic politics carries serious risks. Iran’s support for the Fatemiyoun, the Afghan Shia force that fought in Syria, does not prove it intends to deploy them in Afghanistan, and treating that force as a ready-made proxy overstates both its cohesion and Tehran’s control over it.

Pakistan’s experience is the cautionary tale. Islamabad backed the Taliban for years to preserve influence and counter rivals. After returning to power, the Taliban developed their own priorities and resisted Pakistani demands. Their dispute over the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, has become a major source of tension. Iran could repeat the mistake if it assumes that backing Afghan factions guarantees control over their future choices.

There is another danger. If Iran and Pakistan compete by supporting rival Afghan factions, Afghanistan could fracture further. But the neat ethnic map, with Iran backing Shia and Persian speakers and Pakistan backing Pashtuns, oversimplifies reality. Afghan politics is cross-cutting, and Iran has historically worked with non-Shia actors too. The real competition would likely run through specific levers: border crossings, fuel, electricity, refugee policy, and the selective patronage of individual strongmen rather than whole communities.

Afghanistan does not need to trade Pakistani interference for Iranian interference. Lasting stability cannot be built by excluding the Taliban’s opponents or imposing a government from abroad. It requires an arrangement in which Afghanistan’s diverse communities participate and power is not monopolized by one movement. Outside powers, including Washington, have limited ability to engineer that outcome. What they can do is avoid making it harder: refuse to fund rival proxies, keep humanitarian channels open, and stop treating Afghanistan as a venue for settling scores elsewhere.

One practical step would make a difference. Washington and its partners could protect humanitarian and commercial transit through Chabahar from sanctions disruption, while pressing both Tehran and Islamabad to keep their borders open to Afghan trade. Giving Afghanistan more than one outlet to the sea reduces the leverage either neighbor holds over it, and that is the surest way to keep Afghan politics from becoming a contest between them.